The law relating to motor vehicle insurance is subject to governance from both national and EU law. Nationally, and at a statutory level, the Road Traffic Act 1988 (RTA88) regulates (inter alia) much of the requirements relating to compulsory thirdparty insurance. This requires that motor vehicles used on a road or other public place 1 are subject to a minimum of compulsory insurance to protect third party victims of a negligent driver. In the event that the victim suffers damage and/or loss due to the actions of an uninsured driver or an untraced vehicle, extra-statutory arrangements 2 (established between the Secretary of State for Transport and the Motor Insurers' Bureau (MIB)) take effect.
Since 1972 the EU has issued six directives on motor vehicle insurance law with the aim, initially, of facilitating the free movement of goods, services and people through a system of comparable minimum standards for motor insurance. Collectively they create a legal framework for ensuring that individuals injured by motor vehicles registered anywhere in the EU are guaranteed compensation and receive comparable treatment. 3 As outlined in the first motor vehicle insurance directive (MVID), member states were to "ensure that civil liability in respect of the use of vehicles normally based in its territory is covered by insurance." 4 There were problems inherent in the use of broad terminology in the first MVID and specifically in its reference to "civil 3 liability… covered by insurance." Such an inclusion provided member states with significant discretion in its implementation in national law and led to a series of (permissible) exclusions being applied. For example, exclusions of liability to passengers; 5 family members; 6 third party cover in the event of the driver being intoxicated; 7 and the insurance requirements applied to the seating area of vehicles 8 were each included in the national law of some member states. Subsequent MVIDs 9 removed some of the worst offending aspects of the first directive, as did the activism of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).
The second MVID extended the protection afforded to the victims of motor vehicle accidents by requiring member states to establish a national compensatory guarantee scheme tasked with providing compensation to the victims of uninsured drivers and untraced vehicles. 10 Further, it imposed restrictions on member states' discretion to permit contractual exclusion clauses or restrictions of liability. 
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were required to ensure third-party motor vehicle insurance covered property damage and personal injury, it removed the ability of insurance policies to exclude members of the driver's family from third-party cover, and it imposed minimum amounts in compensation for property and personal injury claims. The third MVID 11 sought to remove the uncertainty as to the geographic scope of insurance policies as articulated in the first MVID, 12 thereby removing the existing disparities between the law of member states. It also introduced the concept of mandatory protection to cover all passengers. The aim was to provide "a high level of consumer protection" -hence viewing individuals in the member states not only in terms of them being potential accident victims but also as consumers purchasing insurance cover as required by EU law. The fourth MVID 13 required the creation of national information centres with responsibility for maintaining relevant information on motor vehicles, insurance policies, the green card scheme and so on. The fifth MVID 14 offered revisions to minimum compensation levels and the identification of cyclists and pedestrians as special categories of accident victims who, along with other non-motorised road users, were to be included in the coverage of all insurance policies. Most recently, the 11 EWCA Civ 446 at [37] : "In summary, the obligation on the English courts to construe domestic legislation consistently with Community law obligations is both broad and far-reaching. In particular: still be remedied and the UK continues to be subject to enforcement actions at both EU and national levels for any failures to correctly transpose and apply the law.
Following the appointment of Teresa May to the position of Prime Minister in July 2016, she has continued to issue the mantra of 'Brexit means Brexit' when referring to comments on her position regarding the intention of the government to exit the EU.
During her premiership May has insisted that the will of the electorate has to be respected and that an exit of the EU is the intention of the government. However, she has also cautioned that the exit negotiations are not to be rushed and the details will not be determined until the government's objectives are clear. One of the key issues that will define the scope and content of those negotiations with the EU will be the restriction of immigration, indeed it has been referred to as a "red line" in any negotiated deal. 22 Yet, important questions remain unanswered in the announcements since the referendum result and despite the government's white paper 23 will, prior to the UK's withdrawal, issue 80% of the 3.6 million EU citizens living in the UK with permanent residency rights. The remaining 600,000 individuals will be offered "amnesty" to remain.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/10/07/every-eu-migrant-can-stay-after-brexit-600000-will-begiven-amne/?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter (accessed 8 October 2016). This is reiterated in the white paper (n 23) where at para. 6.4, p. 30 "The UK remains ready to give people the certainty they want and reach a reciprocal deal with our European partners at the earliest opportunity. It is the right and fair thing to do." 26 The Bill will replace the European Communities Act 1972 but its commencement date will be on "Brexit day".
27 "There will be no unnecessary delays in invoking Article 50. We will invoke it when we are ready.
And we will be ready soon. We will invoke Article 50 no later than the end of March next year."
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-37532364 (accessed 2 October 2016). 28 Likely to be announced in the Queen's speech in May 2017.
9 based 29 or inspired laws will become national law and hence will remain unless and until they are formally withdrawn according to reviews undertaken by the relevant 43 However, the Vienna Convention is of more interest in relation to the aftermath of the triggering of the Art. 50 TEU mechanism. Whilst Art. 50 TEU is silent on the matter of whether the application for withdrawal may be reversed (revoking the application), the Vienna Convention allows for such action unless this is specifically denied. The "point of no return" occurs two years' after the notification under Art. 50 TEU and therefore it may be possible for further challenges to the process and terms of the UK's withdrawal. Hence, the Supreme Court decision remains, of course, highly significant but it should not necessarily be seen as an end to legal proceedings on Brexit.
Art. 50 TEU envisages that once a declaration is formally made, the process of withdrawal will take up to a period of two-years to complete. 44 It is quite possible that this time period could be extended given the short time frame of two-years, the complexity of any future relationship between the UK and EU, 45 and the current lack of pre-Art. 50 TEU negotiations with the EU. The time frame is designed to facilitate 42 Reliance on principles of international law would seem contrary to the sui generis legal orthodoxy of EU law. 43 Art. 54 allows for the withdrawal, by a party to an international treaty, on satisfaction that the withdrawal is in conformity with the terms of the particular treaty or at any time with the consent of the other parties (e.g. member states). Given the existence of Art. 50 TEU, this route would now be very unlikely and unnecessary. 44 Art. 50(3) TEU. 45 For instance, in the Prime Minister's Brexit speech 17 January 2017, she indicated the UK wishes for a bespoke deal with access to the customs union and comprehensive free trade, but without the necessity of membership of the EU. wants Britain to become a full independent member of the WTO. In the article he is paraphrased as remarking "Britain is instead expected to pursue a deal which will 'maximise access' to the Single Market while retaining the ability to make free trade deals."
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/09/29/liam-fox-signals-britain-will-leave-the-single-market-inhard-br/ (accessed 4 October 2016). Ultimately, the greater the access that non-member states have to the EU, the more they must adhere to market rules and the greater the financial contribution expected of them. 48 The UK will not seek to remain a member of the Single Market but will seek a free-trade deal with the EU, and the legal jurisdiction of the CJEU over the UK will end 49 Which has four member countries -Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. 50 Which would allow participation in the single market (not, however, with regards the Common Agricultural and the Fisheries Policies) but do so based on the application of the fundamental freedoms of EU law. It would require a continued, albeit reduced, financial contribution to the EU budget but CJEU (delivered after 1991), yet it would be subject to the EFTA Court (albeit this court often produces rulings of a non-binding nature and its jurisdiction is significantly smaller than that of the CJEU , 54 it appears unlikely that such an agreement can be concluded on these terms. Consequently, the analysis in this article is taken from the perspective of a hard Brexit and the implications this will have on the RTA88.
without the contribution to the formation of EU law, and it would release the UK from the direct scope of CJEU rulings, but this may be a pyrrhic victory as the EFTA Court follows the CJEU.
51 Which would allow very limited access to the single market, but would mean no financial contribution to the EU budget, no requirement to apply the fundamental freedoms of EU law, not being subject to CJEU rulings, and no contribution to the formation and conclusion of future EU law.
52 Which would allow no direct access to the single market, would mean no financial contribution to the EU budget, no requirement to apply the fundamental freedoms of EU law, not being subject to CJEU rulings, and no contribution to the formation and conclusion of future EU law. Beyond the detail of the MVIDs and their effect on the RTA88, the application of key principles of EU law, including equivalence and effectiveness, appear in jeopardy.
BREXIT: THE CONSEQUENCES FOR RTA88
The interaction between national law and EU law, and the decades of case law that If we begin by assuming that the UK will simply withdraw from the EU and leave the Single Market, thereby not being bound by EU law, the UK will be free of the interference of the CJEU and will no longer have to transpose future MVIDs or give effect to the existing MVIDs (save for those elements already transposed into national law after "Brexit day"). Thereafter, the UK will revert to the scope and national 58 In February 2016, the government presented a report to Parliament "The process for withdrawing from the European Union" Cm 9216 where it concluded that withdrawal from the EU could "… lead to up to a decade or more of uncertainty." (para 2.9). 59 Indeed, it may be necessary, via the branch of the civil service dedicated to facilitating Brexit, for a new method of statutory interpretation to be developed to aid with consistency and determinacy. These cases are presented as examples of the national courts adopting a narrow and restrictive application of statutes which seek to protect vulnerable third party victims of motor vehicle accidents. The judiciary had the benefit of guidance from the CJEU (through the reference procedure) to assist them achieve a consistent application of EU law, yet decided against this. Even when theorizing whether a broader application of national law to comply with an EU law with primacy should be adopted, in each aspect the judiciary decided, rather, to provide a very restrictive and literal
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interpretation. 65 The EU has developed the MVIDs to offer increased protection to third party victims and this is reflected also in the jurisprudence of the CJEU. On the contrary, even though the victims in the cases above were seeking compensation and had a route available to them through EU directives, the national judiciary decided against applying the law consistently.
With regards to the current interpretation and scope of the RTA88, ss. by a driver of a tractor and trailer. As the vehicle was never taken from the private land on which the farm was situated, no insurance policy was held to cover for any accidents associated with this vehicle. The CJEU was tasked with identifying whether the MVIDs extended to requiring insurance to be held merely for road registered vehicles or to all motor vehicles, properly used, regardless of the fact that national law did not require compulsory motor insurance to be held. Advocate-General Mengozzi identified the MVIDs as seeking to protect individual victims of accidents on public and private land, and the CJEU's judgment confirmed the need for insurance of motor vehicles in such a location. 81 Yet, the UK still maintains the "black-hole" that currently exists in national motor insurance law as regards the protection of third party victims of non-road registered vehicles (such as quad-bikes or vehicles used in purely agricultural, construction, industrial, motor sports or fairground activities). There is no requirement under the RTA88 for such vehicles to be subject to insurance and therefore the third party victim would be unable to claim from a contractual insurer, no statutory insurer would exist, and the MIB would also be unwilling to settle the claim. The MIB only has a responsibility to act as insurer of last resort in cases of no insurance, but only where the vehicle was legally required to be subject to an insurance policy (and evidently these classes of vehicle are not so required under the current interpretation of national law). Further, the definition of "motor vehicle" provided in s. 185 is, following the implications of Vnuk, 82 too restrictive to comply with the MVIDs. 83 In interpreting that term (and as a result determining the circumstances in which motor vehicle insurance is compulsory), a court would revert to the current national interpretation (although at the time of writing it would be more accurate to refer to the content of ss.
143 and 185 as remaining (rather than reverting) due to the continued inaction of the UK and which is unacceptable until a formal UK withdrawal from the EU). 84 Unless either Parliament chooses to change the law, the judiciary hear a case which offers an opportunity to provide a consistent interpretation (and they take that route), or a successful enforcement action is taken against the state by a third party victim, it is more likely that the national law in this area will not be changed and a gap in the protection of victims will remain. A proposed seventh MVID may be established by the European Parliament 85 to clarify the implications of the Vnuk 86 ruling, but given the time frame for the creation and required transposition of directives, it is unlikely to affect the law in the UK, although presumably the UK may contribute to the consultation process whilst still a member state. Section 148 RTA88, 87 providing the statutory restriction on exclusion clauses in motor insurance policies, was subject to interpretation by the Court of Appeal in EUI v Bristol Alliance Partnership. 88 Here, the driver of a motor vehicle attempted to commit suicide by driving his car into a department store and in so doing struck another motorist's vehicle and caused damage to the building. 89 The contractual insurance policy included a clause excluding the insurer's liability for any action taken by the driver with the intention of causing deliberate damage. As such, the driver was considered to be ostensibly uninsured therefore leaving the owner of the building (and of the other vehicle) unable to recover its losses from the driver's insurers. Further, the extra-statutory protection offered through the UDA 1999 was ineffective as it, at that time, it excluded subrogated claims. 90 The reason the insurer was permitted to avoid the policy was that such an action was not expressly excluded by the RTA88. At s. 148(2) eight "matters" 91 (exclusions) are listed, which, if used by an insurer to avoid a policyholder's claim under that policy would be held as void.
Therefore, if the insurer's attempt to exclude its liability on the policy was for a 87 Interestingly, there is no equivalent provision to this section of the Act in the Road Traffic (Northern 90 UDA 1999 cl 6(1)(c)(ii). 91 The eight matters include the age or physical/mental condition of persons driving the vehicle; the condition of the vehicle (for example, a car's illegally worn (bald) tyres); the number of persons that the vehicle carries; the weight/physical characteristics of the goods which the vehicle carries; the time at which/areas within which a vehicle is used; the horsepower/cylinder capacity or value of the vehicle; the carrying on the vehicle of particular apparatus; or the carrying on the vehicle of any particular means of identification other than that required by law.
reason (or "matter") included in this section of the Act, the insurer would still have to satisfy a third party's claim for damage or loss suffered as a consequence of the accident. The eight "matters" did not expressly prevent the use of an exclusion of liability for the consequences of deliberate damage and hence the Court of Appeal had to determine whether the list of matters in s. 148(2) was illustrative or exhaustive. The
Court of Appeal considered the compatibility between s. 148(2) and the MVID Art. 5
even though, at an EU level, the issue was clear. to benefit from using the "Article 75 procedure" 99 to handle claims on poorer terms for the victim of an accident than would be available through a contractual claim, and following Brexit will enable the industry to continue this practice without questions of compatibility with a higher source of law being raised. Until Brexit, the UK should delete the "matters" from the s. 148(2) RTA88 as their existence (wrongly) implies that other exclusions are permitted.
The RTA88 holds that in the unauthorised or non-contractual use of the vehicle, no third party cover is provided in the policy (with the exception of the eight "matters" However, it appears the current approach taken by the government will see the end of each of these requirements and impositions. With the removal of the free movement principles, 126 the UK will be free of the requirements to provide enforcement mechanisms to challenge the state for losses associated with breach of EU law. That enforcement, so linked with legal certainty in relation to the application of directives where the national law lacks clarity, precision and an unequivocal legal framework, 127 is removed and will greatly reduce individuals' ability to hold the state to account. parties (in particular the insurance industry which has such a marked impact on the UDA and UtDA). Existing restrictions on executive discretion and reviews of the agreements concluded between the Secretary of State and the MIB will no longer be subject to external scrutiny (and enforceable correction). Brexit will certainly facilitate the continuation of a conservative, austerity-based ethos to prevail which will lead to contractual relationships being the primary source of protection with the state being a begrudging and reluctant safety net.
Beyond these fundamental principles being changed, practical problems will also be created. A "hard" Brexit will require individuals based in the UK driving to the EU (or even simply visiting and being involved in a vehicular accident) to have in place bespoke insurance cover. They will be unable to rely on an (EU regulated) central guarantee fund body facilitating their claim for compensation for accidents occurring in another member state. 137 Such contractual relationships will change. Currently, the MVIDs provide a comprehensive and inclusive package of safety features and guarantees regarding social policy requirements for victims of accidents. The national law, conversely, offers restricted cover and the application of permissible contractual exclusions. The fourth MVID 138 enabled extensive provision for cross border claims and direct rights of action which are also likely to be lost following Brexit.
Brexit may mean Brexit, but it marks a fundamental shift in the rights of third party victims of negligent driving and the development of statutory protections. Given the disparity between the UK and the EU in this area, this does not bode well for the protective rights currently accessible to injured motorists, passengers and pedestrians. 
